place great value on individual rights and uphold the importance of protecting personal information from external, and especially governmental, intrusion.
1 However, the acquisition, storage, and use of personal health information are required for many core public health activities. 2 Concerns about confidentiality have fueled debates about the proper balance of individual and societal interests. Disease surveillance and reporting have often been controversial, particularly for sexually transmitted disease and tuberculosis in the first half of the 20th century 3 and more recently regarding HIV 4 and diabetes. 5 New York City's public health champion of the early 20th century, Hermann M. Biggs, MD, recognized that the only way to make public health reporting more acceptable was to ensure confidentiality. As Biggs explained in 1897 when emphasizing the confidentiality of tuberculosis reporting, "Notification to [public health] authorities does not involve notification to the community at large." 6(p155) Confidentiality concerns are even more sensitive in the digital age. High-profile breaches of individuals' health information have heightened anxiety about privacy, 7 as have plans to create interconnected electronic health information networks. 8 In the public health arena, several well-publicized breaches have occurred within the past few years, including the accidental attachment of an electronic file containing the names and addresses of 6500 HIV/AIDS patients to an e-mail in a county health department, 9 the theft from an employee's car of a state health department laptop computer containing information on approximately 1600 families, 10 and a state health department employee's misuse of a computerized list of AIDS patients to look up acquaintances, 11 among other breaches. [12] [13] [14] [15] Although only a few of these incidents have received significant media attention, breaches might not be particularly rare. Despite a possible reporting bias caused at least in part by increased scrutiny given matters of information technology over the past 8 to 10 years, security breaches appear to have increased in general and in the medical field in particular; 15, 16 there is no reason to think that public health departments are immune from the phenomenon. In fact, when probed, one quarter of state public health agencies reported at least 1 security breach in the previous 2 years, 17 and a similar proportion of health care information executives and security officers reported attempted or successful intrusions into their companies' electronic information systems within the previous year. 18 These incidents are probably underestimated, given the increasing extent to which public health agencies have been operating and transmitting information electronically in recent years, although the data to confirm an increasing trend (such as comparative studies of breaches in the pre-electronic and electronic eras) are lacking. Although breaches occurred in the pre-electronic era, and continue to occur involving data in paper formats, certain features of electronic data have dramatically increased the potential magnitude and severity of these incidents. Here, we identify and provide means to address threats to the delicate balance between the need for public health agencies to acquire data and the demand for security of sensitive information.
This review is particularly relevant to those who are implementing programs but are not yet fully conversant with information technology security principles and practices; a basic understanding of these topics is important for effective collaboration and cooperation with colleagues in multiple fields, including those in information technology. This review applies not only to public health agencies, but also in clinical, research, and academic settings. Preventive measures including policies, education, and engineering controls can be implemented to protect data; some emerging technologies may further strengthen data security. Failure to take preventive action can put both privacy and public health at risk.
COMPETING DEMANDS IN THE PUBLIC HEALTH CONTEXT
Public health agencies frequently require individually identifiable health information to conduct certain public health activities. An increasing number of functions, including terrorism preparedness, public health surveillance, outbreak and incident investigations, program implementation and evaluation, and direct health services such as clinical public health services and research, require the acquisition, use, maintenance, and storage of personal health information. Successful execution of these functions depends on data quality and accessibility. 2 Heightened security is paramount to maintaining public confidence; good health care and good public health practice depend on patients providing accurate, sensitive information to their providers in a timely manner. Patients are justifiably concerned that a breach may lead to embarrassment, stigma, or discrimination; that they could potentially lose their job, health insurance, and housing 1 ; or they could suffer other serious consequences. Patients may also be increasingly wary of breaches as reports of identity theft from illicitly obtained identifiable health information become more common. 19 As perceived risks of privacy or security breaches increase, patients might avoid care. 20, 21 Such behavior could harm an individual's health (e.g., forgoing tests or treatment to avoid collection of personal health information), 20, 21 as well as the public's health (e.g., avoiding treatment for a contagious disease as a result of fearing an invasion of privacy). 20 Certain information, including HIV/AIDS surveillance information and mental health or substance abuse data, is particularly sensitive and often receives greater confidentiality protection under the law 22 ; some states and localities have enacted "superconfidentiality" laws for these diseases. 23 However, placing restrictions on data acquisition, use, and disclosure also poses risks, particularly if these restrictions impede acquisition of key surveillance data that would otherwise be used to prevent disease, investigate causation, or identify and enable interventions to protect an exposed population. 20 
THE MIXED BLESSING OF THE DIGITAL AGE
Improved information technology benefits many areas of public health including health care delivery, surveillance, research, and education. 24 Electronic patient information offers many advantages over paper records. For example, information can be more easily standardized, permitting faster retrieval and review. The number of forms, both paper and electronic, can be reduced as well. Although institutions transitioning to electronic data will incur costs initially, this transformation could ultimately increase data reliability and access, reduce errors, and save money. 25 Additionally, electronic data can potentially permit realtime public health surveillance 21 and facilitate faster emergency response. Although not within the scope of this article, other benefits of implementing electronic systems include improved data collection speed, reduced errors in field research settings (with the use of electronic devices and data collection), and improved health education and training programs (with enhanced electronic access to essential information). In some ways, electronic media may be easier to protect than paper records, because authentication, authorization, and auditing-the key components of identity and access managementare all facilitated. Authentication, the process of determining whether the person accessing data is authorized to do so, can restrict access to sensitive electronic databases. Information in these databases can be organized into security levels, giving users access to different levels of information depending on each user's security clearance.
1 For example, with paper records, clerical staff can have access to an entire record; with electronic records, this access can be limited only to that information to which that specific person has a right and a need to know. Public health agencies can improve accountability by establishing the capacity to create a precise audit trail that determines who has accessed a record, when the record was accessed, and what changes if any were made to the record. 26 Authentication, multilevel authorization, and audit trails are difficult or impossible to implement with paper records. However, some features of electronic data present significant security threats. Information can be easily and rapidly copied, transported (e.g., via mobile computers such as laptops or portable media devices such as flash drives), and disseminated (e.g., via e-mail or Web posting) using a variety of wireless or wired networks, anywhere in the world, at little or no cost, in very little time, and possibly without a trace. This would have been impossible in the era of paper records. Furthermore, access may be uncontrolled, or access controls may fail; often, a single entry point provides access to information about many thousands of individuals. 27 In addition, tampering with unprotected electronic files may be more difficult to detect.
 HEALTH POLICY AND ETHICS 
THREATS
Security threats are both physical and electronic ( Table 1) . Devices that might threaten physical and electronic security if stolen or illicitly accessed include wireless e-mail devices (e.g., Blackberries), tokens used for remote network access ("hard tokens"), portable flash drives and other portable media, and computers (both stationary desktops and portable laptops). Network access management and information transfer (i.e., fax or e-mail), either intra-or extrainstitutional, also pose unique challenges (Table 2) .
Public health departments are also at risk for internal and external intruders (Table 3 ). Internal intruders include current employees with malicious intent as well as former employees or contractors whose physical or electronic access has not been revoked. Current employees with electronic access to agency systems may abuse their access or hack into systems without authorization. External intruders may be burglars, who threaten physical security, or hackers, who threaten electronic security. Therefore, intrusion detection and prevention systems should be deployed to monitor both internal and external networks.
PREVENTION Policy
Although the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) has strengthened protections for health information in some medical contexts, public health agencies are largely exempt from HIPAA except when providing direct care and electronically transmitting information in connection with certain transactions (e.g., billing). 28 States and municipalities have been assigned primary responsibility for protecting public health confidentiality, yet state and local public health laws vary and have been described as "antiquated, fragmented, inconsistent and incomplete." 29(p77) Only one third of state public health agencies have written policies regarding privacy and confidentiality of patient information. 17 Even where they exist, state and local public health laws pertaining to the protection of health information require review and reform. 29 Several model acts have been proposed 2,29,30 but not widely adopted. To prevent information breaches that might erode the public's trust, state and local public health agencies should implement and enforce new policies. As a preventive measure, public health agencies should establish routine disclosure protocols. Such protocols should include a brief verification process consisting of 4 separate confirmations:
(1) the appropriateness of the disclosure (i.e., is the disclosure authorized by policy or law?), (2) the integrity of the information being disclosed (i.e., if the information is being manipulated for purposes of disclosure, has it been double-checked to verify that it still accurately reflects the information received by the agency?), (3) the identity of the person receiving the disclosed information (i.e., is this person authorized to receive this information?), and (4) the security of the mode of information transmission (i.e., is this how information is usually sent to this person?).
Before allowing nonroutine disclosure (i.e., if an aspect of a routine disclosure changes or disclosure occurs outside of regular operations), public health departments should follow a written policy that ensures a brief period of contemplation, or time-out, to minimize risk of improper disclosure. The concept of a time-out has recently been adopted by clinical medicine in high-risk settings and may also be applied to risky disclosures in public health settings. This timeout involves a pause in activity to review the impending disclosure. The time-out should be adapted to the specific setting of the disclosure but should include at least the above 4 verifications plus an additional reverification (or double-check) in consultation with a program-level personnel expert in the program's confidentiality policy. In particularly complicated cases, legal counsel should also be consulted for guidance.
Practice
Public health agencies can incorporate specific measures into practice to prevent physical and technological security breaches (Tables 1-3 ). Prevention strategies can be divided into 2 major categories: education and preventive engineering. Although education is important, human error will always occur; embedding preventative measures into both electronic and organizational structures is essential. or printers or ability to install them). Encrypt server.
Education
Encrypt back-up of server; store in off-site location with restricted access.Video surveillance of file/server rooms. Audit both user access of and activity on the server.
with policy in any authorized disclosures of personal health information, because the risk of a breach is particularly great when information changes hands.
Preventive Engineering
Preventive engineering is a traditional and effective public health strategy 31 in that it shifts responsibility for action away from the individual, making the default choice the safest choice. Limiting both electronic and physical access is a preventive engineering approach essential to preventing breaches. Access control consists of 3 processes: authentication, authorization, and auditing. Authentication is the process of confirming user identity and can involve multiple factors. Single-factor authentication refers to something the user knows (e.g., a password); multifactor authentication might add either something the user has (e.g., remote access token, smart card) or is (e.g., biometric characteristic such as voice print verification, fingerprint, or retinal scan).
32
Recent technologies have greatly improved access to and reduced the cost of biometric (particularly fingerprint) authentication. Ideally, authentication for access to sensitive areas or networks should include at least 2 factors, a physical device (e.g., remote access token) and a Mental Hygiene installed an access control system so that individuals entering the area containing the HIV/AIDS registry server cannot proceed unless they simultaneously confirm their identity by fingerprint with a biometric scanner and swipe a smart card through a digital reader. Authorization is the process used to determine whether a user should be granted access on the basis of that user's job title, function, and information acquisition needs. Public health agencies should centralize the provision and revocation of access, with substantial input from program supervisors. Frequent auditing serves as both a deterrent and form of enforcement, and should be carried out electronically (e.g., surveilling network access logs) as well as physically (e.g., video surveillance of highly sensitive areas). For example, in the HIV Surveillance and Epidemiology Program, digital video recorders were installed both inside and outside the main entrance as well as within the server room.
Preventive engineering can also include computerized applications to prevent and detect electronic intrusion (i.e., hacking). In areas in which concern about hackers is greatest and in which highly sensitive information is involved, agencies should isolate servers on internal networks without internet connections and use desktop computers that cannot transport data in and out either physically or electronically ("thin clients"). Use of thin clients, which lack Internet access and do not contain hard drives, ports for portable media (e.g., flash drives), or printers, also eliminates the possibility that authorized users will inappropriately transmit highly sensitive information. Another aspect of a systems approach to security is encryption, which is possible for both data "at rest" (i.e., stored on a computer's hard drive) and data "in flight" (i.e., transmitted over a network). Servers, desktop computers, mobile computers, portable media, and e-mail or other forms of data transmission can all be encrypted. Encryption is an important component of preventive engineering because, even if a physical or electronic intrusion occurs, confidential information will still have a high degree of protection.
A summary of key strategies for handling sensitive and highly sensitive information can be found in the box on page 800.
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
Several emerging technologies may further improve the ability of public health agencies to  HEALTH POLICY AND ETHICS  WORM prevents data modification after the initial file is created; the file can only be altered through tracking every change since the file's creation. For example, WORM can protect digital copies of health department-generated birth or death certificates against tampering. Electronic signatures also protect a file during transmission and storage. Three elements compose electronic signature technology: verifying a signer's identity, assuring the authenticity of the document, and using techniques that make it difficult for signers to claim they did not actually sign the document (nonrepudiation). 33 Although being utilized increasingly in clinical care settings, this technology has not yet been widely adopted in the public health sphere. Technology is evolving to scale up multifactor authentication in situations in which many users require remote access to a given network. In such instances, the cost and administrative complexity of distributing separate pieces of hardware (e.g., remote access devices or smart cards) becomes too burdensome. Instead, remote access control can be achieved through use of "soft tokens," which are digital certificates downloaded to an identified user's computer. (The digital certificate becomes the second authentication factor, where the user identification and password is the first.) For example, health departments can provide soft tokens to community-based physicians that grant remote access to the agency's server to securely submit required health documents.
New technology also allows for the creation of a single signon to agency networks. By moving user identifications and passwords into a centrally organized directory, users need only log onto the network once, without having to log on separately for each application they wish to use. The philosophy behind this approach is to enforce a single, secure authentication step instead of multiple weaker steps that encourage people to use the same easy-to-remember (and potentially easy-to-guess) password for the different systems and applications they use, or to write down their numerous passwords in nonsecure locations.
Another promising technology is digital rights management. Already in use to protect copyrighted materials such as recorded music, this technology might be applied to protect public health agency data. Digital rights management would allow the data's owner to designate access for only a finite period, after which access expires. For example, this technology might enable the tuberculosis control bureau of a public health department to disclose the record of a patient's previous tuberculosis treatment to a physician currently treating the patient's relapse, but would only permit the physician to read this record within a specified time from its receipt, and could place additional controls over whether the information can be copied, disseminated, or printed. This technology helps preserve confidentiality even after data disclosure and limits harm in the event of a breach.
The rapid pace of technology development and evolution underscores the importance of guidance from high-level information technology experts regarding the
